We propose gossip algorithms that can preserve the sum of network values (and therefore the average), and in the meantime fully protect node privacy in terms of their initial values even against external eavesdroppers possessing the entire information flow and network knowledge. At each time step, a node is selected to interact with one of its neighbors via deterministic or random gossiping. Such node generates a random number as its new state, and sends the subtraction between its current state and that random number to the neighbor. Then the neighbor updates its state by adding the received value to its current state. It turns out that this type of privacy-preserving gossiping algorithms can be used as a simple encryption step in a number of consensus-based distributed computation or optimization algorithms, so that we can fully protect the individual algebraic equations or cost functions from being observed or reconstructed throughout the processing of such algorithms. With deterministic gossiping we establish its concrete privacy-preservation guarantee by proving impossibilities for the reconstruction of the node initial values, and potential strategies of adversarial eavesdroppers are investigated in details.
Introduction

Background and Motivation
The development of distributed control, optimization, and computation algorithms has become one of the central streams in the study of complex network operations, due to the rapidly growing volume and dimension of data and information flow from a variety of applications such as social networking, smart (ii) (Local Privacy Preservation) Each node i never reveals its initial value β i to any other agents or a third party;
(iii) (Global Privacy Preservation) (β 1 . . . β n ) is non-identifiable given (β 1 . . . β n ) ;
(iv) (Summation Consistency)
The condition (i) requires that the information flow of the algorithm must comply with the underlying graph; the condition (ii) says that during running of the algorithm no node will have to directly reveal its initial value β i ; the condition (iii) further suggests that even if final node states are known, it should not be possible to use that knowledge to recover β i ; the condition (iv) asks for that sum of the output of the algorithm should be consistent with that of the input. The global privacy preservation condition can be certainly strengthened to the case where the β i should be unidentifiable given the full information of the intermediate node states throughout the running of the algorithm. Definition 1. An algorithm running over the node set V is called a Privacy-Preserving-Summation-Consistent (PPSC) algorithm, which produces output (β 1 . . . β n ) from the network input (β 1 . . . β n ) , if the four conditions on graph compliance, local privacy preservation, global privacy preservation, and summation consistency are all satisfied.
Applications
We now show that such PPSC algorithms can be used as a universal privacy preservation component in distributed computations via two basic examples in average consensus and network linear equations.
To this end, we introduce w ij = w ji > 0 as the weight of the edge {i, j} ∈ E, and w ii > 0 denote the self-weight of node i ∈ V. We assume j∈N i {i} w ij = 1 for all i ∈ V.
Average Consensus
Each node i ∈ V holds y i (t) ∈ R, t ∈ Z ≥0 . The standard averaging consensus algorithm is given by
Under this algorithm, one has lim t→∞ y i (t) = n j=1 y j (0)/n, i ∈ V if and only if G is connected. It is known that with y 1 (0) = β 1 , . . . , y n (0) = β n the initial node states (β 1 , . . . , β n ) can be recovered by each node i from a finite number of its observations of y i (t), t ∈ Z + under some observability conditions [24] . We can now run a distributed PPSC algorithm over (β 1 , . . . , β n ) and generate (β 1 , . . . , β n ). Letting y i (0) = β i , i ∈ V in (1) , there still holds lim t→∞ y i (t) = n j=1 β j /n, but β i has been kept as private information for node i.
Network Linear Equations
Consider a linear algebraic equation with respective to unknown y ∈ R r Hy = z
with H ∈ R n×r , z ∈ R n . Let h i denote the i-th row of H and z i denote the i-th component of z. Let y i (t) ∈ R r be held by i ∈ V. Each node i only knows h i and z i and aims to solve the linear equation by sharing y i (t) with its neighbors in N i . A distributed linear-equation solver has the following form:
where P i : R r → R r is the projection onto the affine space {y : h i y = z i }. A similar analysis as in [16] can be applied on (3), leading to
where y * is an exact solution of the given linear equation. It can be noted that the h i and z i known by node i, in addition to the initial state y i (0), are potentially recoverable by other nodes on the basis of a finite number of their node states under (3) . In the following, we propose a modified network linear equation solver based on PPSC algorithms.
Privacy Preserving Linear Equation Solver
1: Set t ← 0 and y 1 (t), . . . , y n (t) ∈ R r ; 2: Run a PPSC algorithm with input y 1 (t), . . . , y n (t) and produce output y 1 (t), . . . , y n (t); 3: Run the averaging consensus algorithm with input y 1 (t), . . . , y n (t) and output the agreementȳ(t) at each node i; 4: Each node i computes y i (t + 1) ← P i (ȳ(t)). Set t ← t + 1 and go to Step 2 unless satisfactory precision is achieved.
The above privacy preserving linear equation solver produces the following recursion:
which falls to the category of the projected consensus algorithms in [5] . According to Proposition 2 in [5] , each node state y i (t) converges to a solution of the linear equation (2) if it admits exact solutions, i.e., z ∈ span{H}. Along the proposed algorithm, it can be easily seen that y i (t), t ∈ Z ≥0 is kept private to each node i, which means the privacy of the linear equation h i y = z i is also preserved.
Distributed Optimization
Consider a constrained optimization problem min y∈R r n i=1 f i (y), (5) where f i : R r → R is a differentiable convex function only known by node i ∈ V. It was shown in [5] that with an evolving state y i (t) ∈ R r , t ∈ Z ≥0 starting from given y i (0), each node i can solve (5) by implementing the following distributed algorithm:
However, the knowledge of ∇f i for each node i can be potentially disclosed through {y i (t)} i∈V,t∈Z ≥0 along (6) . Inspired by (6) , we provide a privacy-preserving distributed optimizer as following.
Privacy Preserving Distributed Optimizer 1: Set t ← 0 and y 1 (t), . . . , y n (t) ∈ R r ; 2: Each node i computes y i (t) ← y i (t) − 1 √ t+1 ∇f i (y i (t)); 3: Run a PPSC algorithm with input y 1 (t), . . . , y n (t) and produce output y 1 (t), . . . , y n (t); 4: Run the averaging consensus algorithm with input y 1 (t), . . . , y n (t) and output the agreementȳ(t) at each node i; 5: Each node i sets y i (t + 1) ←ȳ(t).
6: Set t ← t + 1 and go to Step 2 unless satisfactory precision is achieved.
The underlying dynamics of the privacy-preserving distributed optimizer described by
Evidently, the proposed distributed optimizer keeps the gradient information ∇f i (y i (t)) strictly private to node i even when {y i (t)} i∈V,t∈Z ≥0 is observed, and therefore protects the privacy of node i in terms of the cost function f i .
Contributions
In this paper, we present a type of gossip-based PPSC algorithms that can preserve the sum of network values (and therefore the average) and fully protect node privacy even for eavesdroppers possessing the entire information flow and network knowledge. At each time step, one node is selected to initialize an interaction with its neighbor via deterministic or random gossiping [18, 26, 27] . This node generates a random number as its new state, and sends the subtraction between its current state and that random number to the neighbor. Then the neighbor updates its state by adding the received value to its current state. In this way, the entire network states will be shuffled without affecting the sum of the states in finite time. With these privacy-preserving gossiping algorithms embedded in distributed computation or optimization, private algebraic equations or cost functions can be protected throughout the processing of such algorithms.. Convergence properties and the convergence limits are also carefully studied, with concrete privacy-preservation performance characterized by proven impossibilities for the reconstruction of the node initial values. The proposed deterministic gossip algorithm reveals several key privacy-preserving properties as a theoretic benchmark; the randomized extension then adds to resilience and robustness for the practical implementation of the algorithms while retaining the privacy-preserving advantages. A preliminary version of the results are to be reported at IEEE Conference on Decision and Control in Dec.
2018 [1, 2] , where in the current manuscript we have provided all technical proofs and a number of refined examples.
Paper Organization
The deterministic privacy-preserving algorithm is proposed in Section 2. In Section 3, we introduce the precise definitions of network eavesdroppers and establish a universal non-identifiability theorem, and further investigates the possible strategies of the eavesdroppers and the corresponding performances, illustrated by two numerical examples. The randomized privacy-preserving algorithms are presented in Section 4, in which the trade-off between resilience and privacy preservation is also analyzed. Some concluding remarks are finally drawn in Section 5.
Notation and Preliminaries
Graph Theory
Consider an undirected graph G = (V, E). Nodes i and j are adjacent if {i, j} ∈ E. A sequence of distinct nodes i 0 , i 1 , . . . , i l is said to be a path of length l ≥ 1 between node i 0 and i l if i j and i j+1 are adjacent for all j = 0, 1, . . . , l − 1. A graph G is connected if there exists at least one path between i and j for any i = j ∈ V. A spanning subgraph of G is defined as a graph with its node set being V and its edge set being a subset of E. Then we say T G = (V, E T ) is a spanning tree of connected G = (V, E) if T G is a spanning subgraph of G and is a tree. An orientation over the edge set E is a mapping o :
A directed edge, denoted by an ordered pair of nodes (i, j), is generated under this orientation o if o(i, j) = 1. Particularly, i is the tail of the directed edge (i, j), denoted by Tail (i, j) ; and j is the head denoted by Head (i, j) . The graph G with an orientation o results in a
: o(i, j) = 1, ∀{i, j} ∈ E}, and in turn a sequence of distinct nodes i 0 , i 1 , . . . , i l is said to be a directed path of length l ≥ 1 if (i j , i j+1 ) ∈ E o for all j = 0, 1, . . . , l − 1.
We refer to [28] for more details on graph theory.
Conditional Entropy
Let X be a continuous random variable with the PDF f X and the support set X. Then the differential entropy of X is
Let Y be a continuous random variable with the support set Y. Let f X,Y denote the joint PDF of X, Y .
Then the joint differential entropy of X, Y is
The conditional differential entropy of Y conditioned on X is
This conditional differential entropy h(Y | X) measures the average uncertainty of the outcome of Y over all possible outcomes of X. We refer to [29] for more details on conditional entropy.
Deterministic PPSC Gossiping
In this section, we present a deterministic gossip-based PPSC algorithm. To carry out a deterministic gossiping process over a network, one has to arrange the sequence of node interactions, which is often a hard constraint in practical environments. However, the study of deterministic gossip protocols can eliminate the randomness of the gossiping process, and therefore allow for analysis focusing on the inherent randomness of the node updates themselves. Therefore, deterministic gossip algorithms often serve well as benchmarks for the performance of the general category of gossip algorithms [14] .
The Algorithm
Without loss of generality we assume r = 1, i.e., each node i holds x i (t) ∈ R starting from x i (0) = β i .
Let T G = (V, E T ) be a spanning tree of G. Then we assign an arbitrary orientation o to T G so that an
. . , E n−1 with an arbitrary order. At time t = 1, 2, . . . , T * with T * = n − 1, the following steps are taken in order:
(i) Node Tail(E t ) randomly and independently generates γ t ∈ R according to some distribution with finite mean γ and variance σ 2 γ > 0;
(ii) Node Tail(E t ) computes ω t = x Tail(Et) (t − 1) − γ t and sends ω t to Head(E t );
(iii) Node Tail(E t ) updates its state by x Tail(Et) (t) = γ t , node Head(E t ) updates its state by x Head(Et) (t) =
x Head(Et) (t − 1) + ω t , and each node i
Here γ t , t = 1, 2, . . . , T * are independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables. The algorithm can be re-expressed by the following equations:
for t = 1, 2, . . . , T * . It is obvious that for β i ∈ R r with r > 1, the algorithm (8) can run componentwise along each entry and lead to the same performance in terms of privacy preservation and summation consistency. Clearly, at each time t, only node Tail(E t ) sends
to node Head(E t ). Therefore, we can verify straightforwardly that the algorithm (8) satisfies the Graph Compliance, Local Privacy Preservation, and Summation Consistency conditions from our standing problem definition, leaving Global Privacy Preservation the only property to be further studied.
Remark. The communication content among nodes along the algorithm (8) includes offsets, which are constantly and independently generated at each discretized time. Then private initial states are evidently not perfectly recoverable given only the communication contents. Therefore, the investigation of the property Global Privacy Preservation will be based on the network state observations. In fact, if both the node communication content and the node state trajectories are exposed, it is in generally impossible to achieve full privacy protection under exact convergence guarantees.
Relation to Existing Work
Several privacy-preserving algorithms have been proposed in the literature for consensus seeking based on the idea of injecting random offsets to node state updates [23] [24] [25] 30] . With plain random noise injection into the standard consensus algorithm (1), one inevitably lose accuracy in the convergence limit even in the probabilistic sense [30] . However, one can show that the output of such type of algorithms can be differentially private while maintaining a certain degree of error [23] . It was further shown in [25] that if one carries out noise injection for a finite number of times and then removes the total offsets once and for all, one can obtain convergence at the exact network average. Nodes therefore needed to maintain additional memories of each offset for the implementation of the algorithm in [25] , and the offsets can be detected and reconstructed with the node states update trajectories. Recently, a comprehensive analysis was presented for the privacy protection abilities in noise-injection mechanism for average consensus algorithms with diminishing noises [24] .
We remark that the use of random noise in our algorithm (8) is more than a random offset as one of the node states in the gossiping pair has been fully randomized. This leads to two advantages in terms of convergence and privacy-preservation:
(i) The algorithm (8) converges in finite time where the network sum is accurately maintained at the algorithm output. Even its randomized variations, which will be presented later, converge in finite time along every individual sample. While mean-square convergence [24] or small mean-square error [23] implies that one needs to repeat a number of samples for a single computation task to obtain practically accepted result.
(ii) Noise-injection algorithms are vulnerable against external eavesdroppers who may hold the entire network structure information and the trajectories of node state updates. Such an eavesdropper is in general equivalent 1 to a malicious node connected to the entire network under the framework of [24, 25] , where the entire network initials can be disclosed even with noisy state observations [24] .
By contrast, one can show that under the algorithm (8) the network initials are not identifiable even for external eavesdroppers.
Algorithm Output Statistics
Clearly the algorithm (8) yields a group of random variables as terminal network states. Those random terminal states contain information about the initial value, whose relationship and distributions would affect the further use of such states (as in network linear equation solver, for instance). We therefore establish some characteristics of those terminal states along algorithm (8) .
We describes the order of two directed edges in time as
The following theorem proposes a necessary and sufficient condition for the dependence of two nodes' final states in the case when the two nodes are not directly connected by a path.
Theorem 1. Suppose there exists no directed path in T o G connecting node i and node j. Let i 0 , i 1 , . . . , i l denote the unique undirected path in T G that connects node i and node j with i = i 0 and j = i l . Then along the algorithm (8), x i 0 (T * ) and x i l (T * ) are dependent if and only if there exists 0 < p < l such that the following conditions hold.
(i) i p , i p−1 , . . . , i 0 and i p , i p+1 , . . . , i l are both directed paths.
Intuitively Condition (i) and Condition (ii) in Theorem 1 constrain the directions and selection sequences of the oriented edges on the path i 0 , . . . , i l . It is worth noting that Condition (iii) further characterizes the sequential order of selecting the edges on the path i 0 , . . . , i l , and the edges with one endpoints in the path i 0 , . . . , i l . The following theorem provides a necessary and sufficient condition for the dependence of two arbitrary nodes' final states when there exists a directed path connecting them.
Then along the algorithm (8) there holds that x i 0 (T * ) and x i l (T * ) are dependent if and only if the following conditions hold:
Define Σ t as the covariance matrix of random vector
we provide the definition of the graphical model of a random vector
x(t) [31] .
where the edge set is given by
Then the following theorem for G t holds.
Examples
We now present a few illustrative examples. The algorithm starts with x i (0) = β i , i = 1, . . . , 5 and produces
β i , i.e., network node states sum is preserved. In addition, one can see that the following conditions hold: (i)2, 1 and 2, 3, 4 are both directed paths in T o G ; (ii) (2, 3) ≺ (3, 4); (iii) There exists no node i * such that (i, i * ) ∈ E o T for any i = 1, 2, 3, 4. This shows that the node state pair x 1 (4), x 4 (4) satisfies the dependence conditions of Theorem 1. Clearly x 1 (4) and x 4 (4) are dependent, which validates Theorem 1. Validation of Theorem 2 can be similarly shown from the node state pair x 4 (4) and x 5 (4).
The graphical model G 4 of x(4) is illustrated in Figure 3 . By direct calculation, we have It is clear that Σ 4 /σ 2 γ is the Laplacian of G 4 and this validates Theorem 3.
Example 2. Consider a linear equation Hy
which has an exact solution y * 
with h i being the i-th row of H and z i being the i-th component of z for i = 1, 2, 3. Clearly (9) is a distributed optimization problem defined in (5) . The unique optimal solution isŷ = [1.29 0.32] by simple calculation. Let the privacy-preserving distributed optimizer (7) run over G ring with randomly selected initial states over [0, 1]. Then we plot the trajectories of e(t) Figure 5 , respectively. On the one hand, both e(t) and e (t) go to zero, indicating that the algorithm solves the least-squares problem (9) . On the other hand, e (t) fluctuates throughout the time horizon, implying the privacy preservation of the individual cost functions. 
The evolution of e (t) over time characterizes the encryption process, and the tendency of e(t) and e (t)
shows that the convergence results can be achieved.
Key Lemmas
Noting that the sum of node states remains the same over time, i.e.,
it is evident that each node i's state can be expressed as
where c ij (t) ∈ {0, 1} and d ij (t) ∈ {−1, 0, 1} represents random variable d ij (t)γ j appears in node state
The computation along (8) is a process of the x i (t) gaining and losing these random components. We note a few basic rules for that process.
(i) For any time t ≥ s, γ s and −γ s belong to different node states, i.e., appear in the states of two different nodes.
(ii) Any random component can only be gained at a head from a tail along their directed link.
(iii) The random components do not change their signs when being gained or lost.
The following lemma illustrates the way that a random variable is passed from the state of one node to that of another.
Let node i and node j satisfy d is (t * ) = 0 and d js (t * ) = 0, respectively. Denote i 0 , i 1 , . . . , i l as the unique undirected path in T G connecting node i and j with i = i 0 and j = i l . Define t * ∈ {t * + 1, 2, . . . , T * }.
and only if the following conditions hold:
A lemma concerning the final node states can also be established.
. . x n (T * )] has the following properties.
(i) Let s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T * }. Then there exists unique i, j with i = j such that d is (T * ) = 1 and d js (T * ) = −1.
(ii) If x i (T * ) and x j (T * ) are dependent, then there exists a unique s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T * } that satisfy
The results of Theorems 1 -3 are based on Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, whose proofs are all provided in the appendices.
Global Privacy Preserving Performance
We aim to protect every node's privacy from being inferred by an observer, termed an external eavesdropper in contrast to malicious nodes [24] , who manages to physically eavesdrop on the real-time node states in the process of distributed computation. In this section, we categorize possible eavesdroppers, show the non-identifiability of node initial states under the algorithm (8) , discuss plausible threats to the privacy of network agents, and evaluate the performance of the algorithm (8) for protecting privacy against node state leakage.
Network Eavesdroppers
Eavesdroppers attempt to estimate the input β = [β 1 . . . β n ] through observations of the output β = [β 1 . . . β n ] or even all intermediate network states. We assume the statistics or even distribution of the γ t is public knowledge. We define the knowledge space of potential eavesdroppers as
In other words, eavesdroppers may possess the network topology G, the spanning tree T G , the oriented spanning tree T o G , and even the edge sequence (E 1 , . . . , E T * ) as a prior knowledge. As a result, we impose the following definition. Eavesdroppers may observe the final network state x(T * ) or the entire network state flow x(1), . . . , x(T * ).
Then the update rule given in the algorithm (8) can be written in the following compact form.
where A i = Φ i + I, and v i are the all-zeros vectors except for its Tail(E i )-th component being one and its Head(E i )-th component being minus one with i = 1, 2, . . . , T * . Let C ∈ R n×n and D ∈ R n×T * be matrices with [C] ij = c ij (T * ) and [D] ij = d ij (T * ) being defined in (10) . Introduce γ = [γ 1 . . . γ T * ] . Then from (10) x(T * ) = Cβ + Dγ.
We use P β to denote the probability distribution of [x(1) . . . x(T * ) ] parametrized by β. We also let P * β be the probability distribution of x(T * ) parametrized by β. Then we define two statistical models by
Let ker(M) denote the kernel of a matrix M. For P and P * , we have the following result.
Theorem 4. For Architectural Eavesdroppers, there hold
Furthermore, for Architectural Eavesdroppers, both P and P * are unidentifiable.
Proof. We first analyze the statistical model P . By the chain rule, the probability density function (PDF)
Recall that (11) shows x(t) is a function of x(t − 1) and γ t for t = 1, 2, . . . , T * , which implies that 1) ), t = 2, . . . , T * . According to (11) , all η ∈ ker(A 1 ) satisfy
Clearly (15) and (16) complete the proof of (13) . It is worth noting that ker(A 1 ) is nonempty, because the Tail(E 1 )-th row of A 1 is zero and thus A 1 is not full rank.
A similar analysis will help us draw the desired conclusion for P * . We have now completed the proof.
Theorem 4 shows that both P and P * are unidentifiable for Architectural Eavesdroppers, which immediately implies that P and P * are also unidentifiable for Topological Eavesdroppers since they possess less knowledge than Architectural Eavesdroppers. We would also like to point out that the implication of Theorem 4 for the initial-value protection power with PPSC gossip algorithms is much beyond the statement itself as it is proven under the most general terms on the eavesdroppers. By slightly generalizing it to multi-gossiping form [18] where multiple pairs of nodes can be selected at one time, or the pair sequence is only partially observed, identifiability of the network initials will be further and drastically reduced.
Architectural Eavesdroppers' Estimation Strategies
Though P and P * have been proved to be unidentifiable under algorithm (8) , eavesdroppers can estimate the node initial states based on their observations of node states. In this section, we study the estimating behaviors of eavesdroppers with maximum likelihood estimation and maximum a posteriori estimation.
We assume γ t i.i.d. ∼ N(0, σ 2 ) for t = 1, 2, . . . , T * . Equivalently, we have γ ∼ N(0, Λ) with Λ = σ 2 I.
Theorem 3 shows Λ D /σ 2 is the Laplacian of a tree. In the following subsections, we assume that the algorithm (8) is repetitively applied on a network independently for m > 0 times starting from the same initial value β. Let x i (t) with i = 1, 2, . . . , m and t = 1, 2, . . . , T * denote the system state observed at time t for the m-th trial.
the algorithm (8) clearly states that for all i, j = 1, 2, . . . , m, x i k (1) = x j k (1) for any k = Head(E 1 ), Tail(E 1 ) and
Head(E 1 ) (1). In the following we evaluate the privacy preservation ability of the algorithm (8) against Architectural eavesdroppers who use maximum likelihood estimation and maximum a posteriori estimation. Letβ mle ,β * mle be the maximum likelihood estimators (MLE) of β in P and P * , respectively. Clearly Proposition 4 implies thatβ mle ,β * mle are both nonunique.
MLE with Full State Observations
We first analyze the statistical model P given the observations x(1), x(2), . . . , x(T * ). Let |z| with z being a vector denote the element-wise absolute value of z. Let δ(z) be the Dirac delta function and f Γ (γ i ) be the PDF of γ i with i = 1, 2, . . . , T * . Based on (11), we have for t = 1, 2, . . . , T *
In addition, x j (t) | x(t − 1) with j = Head(E t ), Tail(E t ) have degenerate distributions and take a single value at x j (t − 1). By (17) , the PDF of x(t) | x(t − 1) is given by
Based on (15) and (18), an MLE of β in P is given bŷ
To maximize the objective function in (19) , none of its Delta function factors should be zero, i.e., β must be in the set
It can be seen from (20) to (20) , we have for the bias ofβ mle
and for the covariance matrix ofβ mle
This explains that there exist possible values ofβ mle with nonzero bias and the variance of each element inβ mle does not improve with the increasing number of experiments. Furthermore, σ 2 A 1 A 1 is a zero matrix except for the Tail(E 1 )Tail(E 1 )-th, Tail(E 1 )Head(E 1 )-th, Head(E 1 )Tail(E 1 )-th and Head(E 1 )Head(E 1 )-th entries being σ 2 .
MLE with Terminal State Observations
Now we study the MLE of β in P * . Evidently the distributions of x i (T * ), i = 1, . . . , m are degenerate be-
Λ yy is noted to be nonsingular by Cauchy's interlacing theorem [32] and the fact that Λ D is the Laplacian of a connected graph. From (12), we know x 1 (T * ) | y and y are both normally distributed as follows [33] :
y ∼ N(µ y , Λ yy ).
where φ 1y = Λ −1 yy λ 1y ψ 1y = λ 11 − λ 1y Λ −1 yy λ 1y . Further by Λ D 1 = 0, one has φ 1y = −1, ψ 1y = 0.
Then (22) and (24) imply
Based on (21), (23) and (25), one can find
Evidently the unconstrained optimization problem (26) is equivalent to the constrained one
It is clear that Slater's condition holds for (27) because the only constraint is an affine equality. Then the βs satisfying the following two KKT conditions [34] 
are all the solutions of (27) . This gives uŝ
Clearly E * mle is nonsingular. The analysis above shows thatβ mle ,β * mle are both nonunique for Architectural Eavesdroppers, which is consistent with Proposition 4.
MAP Estimation
For MAP Estimation, we let the eavesdroppers have a normal distribution assumption of the initial state for the simplicity of our analysis, which is also a good approximation of distributions in practical conditions. Assume β ∼ N(µ β , Λ β ) with µ β ∈ R n and Λ β being an n-by-n positive definite matrix. Letβ map ,β * map be the max a posteriori (MAP) estimators of β in P and P * , respectively. According to Bayes' rule
Recall the assumption β ∼ N(µ β , Λ β ). Then (15) and (28) yield
Similar to (19) and based on (29), we know the optimization problem
is equivalent to the following constrained optimization problem
The Slater's condition clearly holds for (30) and the KKT conditions imply that the MAP estimatorβ map of β in P is the the β-part of the solution of
.
It can be easily verified that E map z = 0 implies z = 0. Thusβ map is unique. Analogously, the unique MAP estimator of β in P * can be obtained by solving the following constrained optimization problem:
As a result, the MAP estimatorβ * map of β in P * is the β-part of the solution to
Clearly E * map is nonsingular, leading to the uniqueness ofβ * map .
Topological Eavesdroppers
Clearly the knowledge of Topological Eavesdroppers is strictly less than the Architectural Eavesdroppers, and thus the estimators given by Topological Eavesdroppers would be still nonunique and no better in terms of accuracy. Under the algorithm (8) In the model P * , however, such actions cannot be taken because no state information is given except for x(T * ). Therefore, T o G becomes another parameter that affects the outcome of x(T * ) in the model.
In order to obtain the estimators in P * , Topological Eavesdroppers must assume some prior probability assumption of T o G , and then the likelihood becomes 
Numerical Examples
Two examples are provided in this section to make comparison between the MLEs and the MAP estimators given by different Eavesdroppers. In these examples, we consider the graph G in Figure 1 Time t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4
It is worth mentioning that the true initial state β can be any vector in It is worth noting thatβ * mle is now unique because the eavesdropper has a prior probability assumption of T o G .
Randomization and Resilience/Privacy Preservation Trade-off 4.1 Randomized PPSC Gossiping
In this section, we propose a randomized PPSC algorithm based on classical random gossiping [18] . To this end, let P be a stochastic matrix [32] , i.e., a matrix with non-negative entries possessing a sum one along each row. The matrix P complies with the structure of the graph G in the sense that [P] ij > 0 if and only if {i, j} ∈ E. Compared to deterministic gossiping, randomized gossip algorithms are ideal solutions for distributed systems, where nodes are self-organized with asynchronous clocks [18] . Independently at each time step, a node i is selected with probability 1/n, and then this node i randomly selects a neighbor j ∈ N i with probability [P] ij . This defines a standard random gossip algorithm [18] .
When node i is selected to meet with its neighbor j at time t, node i randomly generates γ t ∈ R and sends x i (t − 1) − γ t to j. Then the nodes i, j update their states by
where γ t , t = 1, 2, . . . are i.i.d. The states remain unchanged for the rest of the nodes in V, i.e.,
Convergence Limits
We let q 1 denote the unique left Perron vector of P with 1 q 1 = 1. Let (q 2 , q 2 ), . . . , (q n , q n ) denote the left-right generalized eigenvector pairs of P satisfying q i q i = 1 for all i = 2, . . . , n. Proposition 1. Let µ γ denote the expected value of γ t . Then along the randomized PPSC gossip algorithm,
Proof. In a compact form, the update of network node states can be written as
where A(t) is a random matrix and v(t) is a random vector. By the structure of the proposed algorithm, one easily know
From (33), it is worth noting that E(A(t)) is a primitive stochastic matrix with left Perron vector being q 1 . Hence [32] lim t→∞ E(A(t)) t = q 1 1 .
By performing Jordan decomposition on P , one can easily obtain from (33) and (34)
Then the desired conclusion can be obtained noticing the independence of the node updates.
Convergence Rate
Introduce H t as the event that all nodes have altered their states at least once during the time s ∈ [0, t].
Then H t holding true implies that the entire network states have been encrypted by the randomized PPSC algorithm. Define ξ = 1 n (P + P )1.
Let ξ i denote the i-th component of ξ. Let 2 S denote the power set of a set S. Recall that an independent set of a graph is a subset of the graph vertex set, in which two arbitrary nodes are not adjacent in the graph [28] . Based on this, a result regarding the convergence rate is shown in the following.
Proposition 2.
Consider an undirected and connected graph G = (V, E). Let the node set V be partitioned into κ > 1 mutually disjoint independent vertex sets W 1 , . . . , W κ , which satisfy
Let π 1 , . . . , π κ denote some arbitrary elements in W 1 , . . . , W κ , respectively. Then there holds
Proof. Now we define n event sequences
where F t i represents the event that the state of node i at time t is unequal to its initial state. Clearly
F t i , t = 1, 2, . . . . We have by the Fréchet inequalities
For i = 1, . . . , κ, it is clear by the Inclusion−exclusion theorem [35] 
It can be noted from the definition of ξ that ξ i ∈ (0, 1] with i = 1, . . . , n represents the probability of the event that node-to-node communication involves node i in a time slot. For each U ∈ 2 W i \{π i } , it is known that any two nodes in U are not adjacent, and thus
Similarly, there holds
Then (39) and (40) yield
The proof is completed by (37) , (38) , (39) and (41).
We can also quantify the rate of convergence by the following -encryption time.
Definition 4. For any ∈ (0, 1), the -encryption time for an undirected and connected graph G = (V, E)
with n nodes and a randomized PPSC gossiping associated with the edge selection probability given in P ∈ R n×n is defined by
Define ξ m = min i ξ i . For the -encryption time, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3. For any ∈ (0, 1) , the -encryption time associated with graph G and matrix P for the random PPSC algorithm satisfies
Proof. Let F t i , i = 1, . . . , n, t = 1, 2, . . . be as defined in the proof of Proposition 2. Then it can be concluded
By (42) and the Fréchet inequalities [36] , we have
By the Fréchet inequalities [36] , one also has
Clearly (43) and (44) complete the proof.
We would like to point out that techniques from optimizing the structure of the work and the selection of the neighbors [20, 37, 38] might significantly accelerate the convergence rate of the algorithm.
Resilience vs Privacy Preserving Trade-off
Throughout the running of the algorithm (8) with deterministic or randomized edge selection over a network, a circumstance may occur that a node chooses to drop out of the network autonomously at a random time. Let us assume that independently at each time step, each node of the network has a probability p d > 0 of dropping out. We focus on a particular time instance t d > 0. Let G t = (V t , E t ) denote the random network at time t = 0, 1, 2, . . . . It is clear that
On one hand, from the point of view of Tail(E t d ), nodes in V t d should have their states sum only yielding a small change compared to that at time t d − 1 due to the node dropout, i.e.,
is preferred to be as small as possible, where E(·) is with respect to the randomness from node dropouts.
By direct calculation we can see that
It worth emphasizing that ω t d = x Tail(Et d ) (t d − 1) − γ t d is also the packet of communication during the node pair interaction at time t d , which will be the error added into the network sum if the communication fails at the receiving node Head(E t d ). Therefore,
serves as a natural network resilience metric. On the other hand, by receiving the packet ω t d , Head(E t d ) or a third party can possibly recover the state x Tail(Et d ) (t d − 1). In that case, Tail(E t d ) would hope
i.e., the entropy of x Tail(Et d ) (t d − 1) given ω t d , to be as large as possible. As a result,
can be a good privacy preservation metric for any time t.
With normal distribution assumptions on both the β i s and the γ i s, x Tail(Et) (t−1) is normally distributed with its mean and the variance denoted asμ andσ 2 , respectively. We can now conclude that
Thus, a tradeoff between network resilience and privacy preservation can be characterized by
where ν ∈ R + is a parameter that weights the importance of the resilience and the privacy preservation capability. With (47) and (48), (49) yields a unique solution γ =μ,
The relation (50) provides an inspiration on how we can generalize the algorithm (8) to the adaptively generated noise sequence γ t . Letting the random variable γ t have a state-dependent mean and variance related to the state of the node that generates it, one can achieve a degree of a balance between resilience and privacy preserving.
Conclusions
In this paper, we adapted the idea of the gossip protocol and proposed privacy-preserving algorithms with consistent summation of node states. We established necessary and sufficient conditions on the dependence of two arbitrary nodes' final states, and characterized the their pairwise dependence with stochastic graphical models. We classified possible categories of network privacy eavesdroppers from their knowledge about the network structure and information flow. It was shown that even the eavesdroppers with full knowledge are unable to reconstruct the network initial values from a non-identifiability theorem, and thus the proposed algorithms can be used to protect each node's private algebraic equations and cost functions in distributed computation and optimization. The strategies of the eavesdroppers for estimating the node initial values by MLE or MAP estimators were also discussed. Some simple but illustrative examples were presented as well. In addition, we proposed a privacy-preserving algorithm with randomized edge selection, whose convergence limit and convergence rate for full-network encryption were established.
As en extension, the trade-off between resilience and privacy preservation was studied. Future work includes the design of optimal network structure for information preservation, and study of the fundamental limits between privacy preservation and computation efficiency in distributed algorithms.
Appendicies Appendix A. Proof of Lemma 1
The conclusion d i l s (t * ) = d i 0 s (t * ) = 0 describes that the random component d i l s (t * )γ s is passed from node i 0 to node i l during the time interval [t * , t * ]. Before presenting the proof, we provide some intuitive explanation on the three conditions. Condition (i) confirms the orientations of edges in the path i 0 , . . . , i l , while the order of the edge selection is given in Condition (ii). Condition (iii) prevents the random component d is (t * )γ s from being passed to the nodes that are not in the path i 0 , . . . , i l . Next the sufficiency and necessity of the conditions are proved, respectively.
Sufficiency. Let E t k = (i k , i k+1 ) for k = 0, 1, . . . , l − 1. Then Condition (ii) is equivalent to
d is (t * ) = 0 states that the random variable d is (t * )γ s appears in the node state x i (t * ). Condition (iii) a) describes that i 0 is not the tail of any edges E t with t * ≤ t < t 0 , and hence guarantees that the random components in x i 0 (t * ), including d i 0 s (t * )γ s , will be kept in x i 0 (t) for all t * ≤ t < t 0 . At time t 0 , node i 0 and node i 1 are chosen to mutually communicate and get their states updated according to the algorithm (8) .
As a result, x i 0 (t 0 ) loses the random component d i 0 s (t * )γ s , which now becomes a component of x i 1 (t 1 ). The similar analysis applied at time t 1 , . . . , t l−1 recursively shows the random component d i 0 s (t * )γ s appears in x i l (t l−1 ) under Condition (i), (ii) and (iii) b). Finally, Condition (iii) c) tells that random component d is (t * )γ s will be kept in x i l (t) for t l−1 ≤ t ≤ t * , which completes the proof of sufficiency.
Necessity. In the following, we prove the necessity of the three conditions. Assume the random component d i 0 s (t * )γ s is passed from node i 0 to node i l during the time interval [t * , t * ]. Recall that the transition of the random variable d i 0 s (t * )γ s occurs from the tail of an edge to the head at each time step. Thus one has (i 0 , i 1 ), . . . , (i l−1 , i l ) ∈ E o T due to the uniqueness of the undirected path i 0 , i 1 , . . . , i l in T G , and completes the proof of the necessity of Condition (i).
According to the orientations of (i k , i k+1 ), there exist time τ k when d i 0 s (t * )γ s appears in the node state x i k (τ k ) for k = 0, 1, . . . , l. By the uniqueness of the directed path from i 0 to i l , τ k s can be arranged in the following order
The definition of E t k directly implies that for k = 0, 1, . . . , l − 1
It is clear (51) and (52) yield
It is evident that if E t 0 ≤ E t * , the random component d i 0 s (t * )γ s can never appear in the state of node i 1 , and thereby the states of i 2 , . . . , i l . Thus one has E t * ≺ E t 0 . In addition, node i l cannot gain the random
Then the necessity of Condition (ii) can be seen from (53), E t * ≺ E t 0 and E t l−1 E t * .
Suppose Condition (iii) a) does not hold for contradiction. Then there exists a node set I * ⊂ V \{i 0 , . . . , i l } such that (i 0 , i * ) ∈ T o G and (i 0 , i * ) ≺ E t 0 for all i * ∈ I * . As a result, the random component d i 0 s (t * )γ s will be passed to some node in I * , which is impossible to be passed to i l again. Thus Condition (iii) a) must hold. Similarly, due to the uniqueness of the path between two arbitrary nodes in spanning trees, the random component d i 0 s (t * )γ s must be always held along path i 0 , i 1 , . . . , i l during time t * ≤ t ≤ t * , which proves the necessity of Condition (iii). Therefore, the only way that the state of node x Tail(Es) loses γ s is to let node Tail(E s ) be the tail of edge E t for some t > s. Suppose there exists a nonempty set T such that Tail(E s ) = Tail(E t ) for all t ∈ T . Definē t = min{t : t ∈ T }. Then by the algorithm (8) x Tail(Es) (t) = γt
x Head(Es) (t) = x Tail(Es) (t − 1) + x Head(Et) (t − 1) − γt, from which we see that the random variable γ s transfers to x Head(Et) (t) without changing its sign. It can be concluded by applying the same analysis that γ s exists in one and only one of all node states for all t ≥ s. Analogously, we can easily know that −γt has the same properties. This completes the proof of (i).
(ii) Since x i (T * ) and x j (T * ) are dependent, there exists a set S ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , T * } such that d is (T * )γ s appears in x i (T * ) and d js (T * )γ appears in x j (T * ) for all s ∈ S. Let i 0 , i 1 , . . . , i l denote the unique undirected path in T G that connects node i and node j with i 0 = i and i l = j. Thus we only need to prove |S| = 1. For every s ∈ S, under the algorithm (8) Head(E s ) = i l , −γ s has to transfer from to x Head(Es) (s) from x i l (T * ). By Lemma 1, the process of transfer requires the path that starts from Head(E s ) and ends at i l is a directed path. In this case, i 0 , i 1 , . . . , i l is a directed path and E s = (i 0 , i 1 ). Similarly, i l , i l−1 , . . . , i 0 is a directed path and E s = (i l , i l−1 ) when Tail(E s ) = i 0 and Head(E s ) = i l . In a general case in which Tail(E s ) = i 0 , Head(E s ) = i l , the paths that connect Tail(E s ) and i 0 , Head(E s ) and i l are both directed paths by Lemma 1, leading to that E s is in i 0 , i 1 , . . . , i l . In conclusion, E s must be in path i 0 , i 1 , . . . , i l and the cases studied above can be summarized as follows.
(iv) Tail(E s ) = i 0 , Head(E s ) = i l ⇒ the paths from Tail(E s ) to i 0 and from Head(E s ) to i l are directed paths and E s = (i l , i l−1 ) ⇒ E s is unique.
This completes the proof of (ii).
Appendix C. Proof of Theorem 1
We start the proof by showing the sufficiency of Condition (i), (ii) and (iii). Without loss of generality, we assume (i p , i p+1 ) ≺ (i p , i p−1 ). Let E tp = (i p , i p+1 ). According to Algorithm (8), the node states x ip (t p ) and x i p+1 (t p ) are given by
As specified by Condition (i), i p , i p−1 , . . . , i 0 is a directed path, which satisfies Condition (i) of Lemma 1.
Condition (ii) gives
satisfying Condition (ii) of Lemma 1. In addition, Condition (iii) is equivalent to Condition (iii) of Lemma 1 for path i p , i p−1 , . . . , i 0 . Thus Lemma 1 shows that random variable γ tp appears in node state x i 0 (T * ), i.e., d i 0 tp (T * ) = 1.
(55)
Analogously, three conditions of Lemma 1 are met for path i p+1 , i p+2 , . . . , i l , which yields
Evidently, (55) and (56) make it sufficient for node states x i 0 (T * ) and x i l (T * ) to be dependent. In the following, we prove the necessity of Condition (i), (ii) and (iii).
Necessity of (i). Since x i 0 (T * ) and x i l (T * ) are dependent, there exist random variables d i 0 tp (T * )γ tp and d i l tp (T * )γ tp that appear in node states x i 0 (T * ) and x i l (T * ), respectively. Algorithm (8) gives
We suppose that γ tp and −γ tp transfer to x Tail(Et p ) (T * ) and x Head(Et p ) (T * ), respectively, i.e., d i 0 tp = 1 and
Due to the uniqueness of paths in spanning trees, nodes Tail(E tp ) and Tail(E tp ) are in path i 0 , i 1 , . . . , i l . Let i p = Tail(E tp ). Condition (i) of Lemma 1 shows that i p , i p−1 , . . . , i 0 and i p , i p+1 , . . . , i l are directed paths. In addition, i p = i 0 and i p = i l because there exists no directed path that connects node i and node j. The necessity of Condition (i) can be similarly proved, provided that −γ tp and γ tp transfer to x Tail(Et p ) (T * ) and x Head(Et p ) (T * ), respectively.
Necessity of (ii). Without loss of generality, we assume (i p , i p+1 ) ≺ (i p , i p−1 ). Now we prove the necessity of Condition (ii). Since the random variable d i 0 tp (T * )γ tp transfers from x ip (t p ) to x i 0 (T * ), Lemma 1 provides (i p , i p−1 ) ≺ · · · ≺ (i 1 , i 0 ).
Similarly, random variable d i l tp (T * )γ tp transfers from x i p+1 (t p ) to x i l (T * ) assures (i p , i p+1 ) ≺ · · · ≺ (i l−1 , i l ).
Clearly (57) and (58) shows the necessity of Condition (ii). Necessity of (iii). We finally prove Condition (iii) is necessary for the dependence result. We have shown above that if the node states x i 0 (T * ) and
x i l (T * ) are dependent, the random variables d i 0 tp (T * )γ tp and d i l tp (T * )γ tp transfer to x i 0 (T * ) and x i l (T * ), respectively. Thus Condition (iii) of Lemma 1 are necessarily met on both path i p , i p−1 , . . . , i 0 and path i p+1 , i p+2 , . . . , i l , which is equivalent to Condition (iii). Now the necessity of all three conditions is proved.
Appendix D. Proof of Theorem 2
First we focus on proving the sufficiency part of the statements. Let E t k = (i k , i k+1 ) for k = 0, 1, . . . , l − 1.
According to the algorithm (8), information transmission occurs on edge (i 0 , i 1 ) at time t 0 . Then it follows
It is seen from (59) that the random variables γ t 0 and −γ t 0 are held by the node states x i 0 (t 0 ) and x i 1 (t 0 ), respectively. Evidently, Condition (ii) specifies that the endpoints of all edges not equal to (i 0 , i 1 ) with their tail being node i 0 exchange information according to the algorithm (8) prior to (i 0 , i 1 ). Thus d i 0 t 0 (T * ) = 1.
Since i 0 , i 1 , . . . , i l is a directed path, Lemma 1 provides that Condition (i) and (ii) guarantees that −γ t 0 transfers to x i l (T * ), i.e., d i l t 0 (T * ) = −1.
(60) and (61) clearly show that node states x i 0 (T * ) and x i l (T * ) are dependent. Now we prove the necessity of these two conditions. Suppose x i 0 (T * ) and x i l (T * ) are dependent. Then there exist random variables d i 0 tp (T * )γ tp and d i l tp (T * )γ tp that appear in x i 0 (T * ) and x i l (T * ), respectively. It is clear that the nodes Tail(E tp ) and Head(E tp ) are in the path i 0 , i 1 , . . . , i l because of the path uniqueness in spanning trees. However, it is impossible that Tail(E tp ) = ik and Head(E tp ) = ik +1 for anyk ∈ {1, . . . , l−1}, because ik, ik −1 , . . . , i 0 is necessarily a directed path by Lemma 1. Hence Tail(E tp ) = i 0 and Head(E tp ) = i 1 .
In addition, d i 0 tp = 1 and d i 1 tp = −1. Finally the random variable −γ tp becomes a component of x i l (T * ).
Thus by Lemma 1, it is necessary for Condition (i) and (ii) to hold, which completes the proof.
Appendix E. Proof of Theorem 3
Lemma 2 (i) implies that at most T * pairs of node states in x 1 (T * ), x 2 (T * ), . . . , x n (T * ) are dependent.
Since it is described in Lemma 2 (ii) that every pair of dependent final node states possess only one of ±γ 1 , . . . , ±γ T * , there are exactly T * pairs of dependent final node states. In addition, it can be calculate the covariance of two dependent states is −σ 2 . Thus |E T * | = T * . Second, we complete the proof that G T * is a tree by showing G T * is connected. We know for an arbitrary node i ∈ V, there exists t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T * } such that i is an endpoint of E t . Thus the algorithm (8) guarantees that each x i (T * ) holds at least one of γ 1 , . . . , γ T * and thereby G T * has no isolated nodes. Assume, for contradiction, that G T * has r connected components with r > 1. Let G S 1 and G S 2 denote two of the connected components of G T * on S 1 , S 2 ⊂ V, respectively. Then there exists s 0 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T * } such that edge E s 0 has one of its endpoints in S 1 and the other in S 2 . Without loss of generality, we assume Head(E s 0 ) ∈ S 1 and Tail(E s 0 ) ∈ S 2 . By the definition of connected components, there exists S ∈ V such that G S is a connected component of G T * on S and there exist node i, j ∈ S such that x i (T * ) holds γ s 0 and x j (T * ) holds −γ s 0 , resulting in {i, j} ∈ E T * . Similarly to the proof of Lemma 2 (ii), the dependence of x i (T * ) and x j (T * ) gives (i) The path from Head(E s 0 ) to i is a directed path and Tail(E s 0 ) = j;
(ii) The path from Tail(E s 0 ) to j is a directed path and Head(E s 0 ) = i;
(iii) The paths from Head(E s 0 ) to i and from Tail(E s 0 ) to j are both directed paths.
In case (i), conditions in Theorem 2 for Head(E s 0 ) and i are still satisfied as a result of the dependence of x i (T * ), x j (T * ) by Theorem 1 or Theorem 2. As a consequence, x Head(Es 0 ) (T * ) and x i (T * ) are dependent and {Head(E s 0 ), i} ∈ E T * . Clearly, the edges {Head(E s 0 ), i} and {i, Tail(E s 0 )} makes neither G S 1 nor G S 2 not connected components. Hence G T * has one connected component, i.e., G T * is connected. Therefore, G T * is a tree in case (i). The same conclusion can be drawn for case (ii) and (iii). Thus G T * is a tree. Next we show Σ T * is the Laplacian of G T * by proving the following properties of Σ T * . Proof of (ii). Suppose node i has r i random variables forming a subset of {±γ 1 , . . . , ±γ T * }. Then [Σ T * ] ii = r i σ 2 . By Lemma 2 (i) and (ii), there exists r i node states that are dependent of x i (T * ) with covariance −σ 2 . This completes the proof of (ii).
It is clear (i) and (ii) show Σ T * is the Laplacian of G T * .
